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Large parts of professional human communication proceed in a
request-reply fashion, whereby requests contain specifics of the in-
formation desired while replies can deliver the required information.
However, time limitations often force individuals to prioritize some
while neglecting others. This dilemma will inevitably force individuals
into defecting against some communication partners to give atten-
tion to others. Furthermore, communication entirely breaks down
when individuals act purely egoistically as replies would never be is-
sued and quest for desired information would always be prioritized.
Here we present an experiment, termed “The expert game”, where
a number of individuals communicate with one-another through an
electronic messaging system. By imposing a strict limit on the num-
ber of sent messages, individuals were required to decide between
requesting information that is beneficial for themselves or helping
others by replying to their requests. In the experiment, individu-
als were assigned the task to find the expert on a specific topic
and receive a reply from that expert. Tasks and expertise of each
player were periodically re-assigned to randomize the required in-
teractions. Resisting this randomization, a non-random network of
cooperative communication between individuals formed. We use a
simple Bayesian inference algorithm to model each player’s trust in
the cooperativity of others with good experimental agreement. Our
results suggest that human communication in groups of individuals
is strategic and favors cooperation with trusted parties at the cost of
defection against others. To establish and maintain trusted links a
significant fraction of time-resources is allocated, even in situations
where the information transmitted is negligible.
communication networks | game theory | experimental economics | complexity
Beyond the notion of kin selection, achieving cooperationbetween individuals has long appeared as a riddle in evo-
lution [1]. Yet, theories in favor of cooperation in repeated
interactions involving memory are now well-established [2, 3].
When described as iterated Prisoner’s Dilemmas, strategies
such as tit-for-tat (TFT), a form of direct reciprocity, can out-
compete repeated defection and a group of defectors can be
invaded by a new individual playing TFT. In support of these
theories, empirical evidence for different types of cooperative
strategies have been presented [1]. Some of this evidence is
based on experiments with human subjects, in an effort to
study cooperation in human society. It was discovered that
the details of the connectedness of subjects are crucial for
the establishment of cooperation. When subjects are orga-
nized on a regular lattice with predefined links to neighboring
subjects, initial cooperation eventually drops to the same low
levels that are obtained when links are randomly reshuffled
after every repetition of the game [4]. These findings were
supported by theoretical models [5]. Conversely, cooperation
has been shown to emerge if individuals can choose their col-
laborators. In this case cooperators cut links with notorious
defectors [6], leading to their isolation in the network.
In the complex social network community, the importance
of dynamically evolving network structure has long been rec-
ognized [7]. Today’s society — especially with regards to busi-
ness, academic or government institutions — is highly depen-
dent on efficient communication, much of which takes place
through online messaging systems, such as electronic mail and
other messaging services. With the ever-growing amount of
highly resolved data from digital communication, the analysis
of such data has correspondingly become a field of heavy re-
search. But how does cooperation in communication networks
emerge and how is it maintained? Theoretical efforts describ-
ing communication on networks exist [8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13], but
little attention has been devoted to the establishment and re-
inforcement of cooperation in these networks. One difficulty
with electronic communication without face-to-face contact
can stem from limited trust in the cooperativity of communi-
cation partners [14]. In experiments which mimicked collabo-
rative tasks through electronic communication subjects were
found to break agreements more frequently than if face-to-
face contact was allowed. The importance of informal com-
munication in virtual teams was pointed out when cooper-
ation takes place through electronic mail, phone, or video-
conferences only [15]. In addition, communication is prone
to defection, due to the inherent capacity limit imposed by
time limitations: Input received in terms of electronic mail or
other types of asynchronous messages simply cannot always
be answered within the time available to subjects [16, 17].
Unresponsiveness may therefore be an intrinsic and often un-
avoidable form of defection in real-world communication.
Our objective is to determine, if even under conditions
that principally favor selfish behavior, cooperation can evolve
in communication networks. We therefore remove all the in-
fluence of external factors that could promote cooperation,
such as reputation through common knowledge of subjects’
behavior — a mechanism which is thought to lead to indirect
reciprocity [18, 19]. Further, we want to avoid the effect of
emotional influence between subjects. To mimic a particu-
larly impersonal communication network, correspondence be-
tween individuals is constrained in such a way as to disallow
all emotional content of messages. Messages are standard-
ised and purvey only factual information and no expression of
emotions, such as regret, thankfulness or anger.
Communication through electronic messages is typically
asynchronous, i.e. there is a time-delay between sending a
message until it is read and potentially replied to. Asyn-
chronous communication places additional burden on effi-
ciency and establishment of trust, e.g. when compared to
telephone communication, which is inherently more personal
and synchronous, since it demands immediate replies. In fact,
in virtual teams, the role of responses in building trust has
been recognized [20]. This study find that a response is a
means of signaling one’s involvement, the willingness to un-
derstand another person’s request and invest time and energy
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in finding a solution. In short, a response creates trust and
this may be independent of the type of response. Trust is
a concept inseparably tied to risk [21]. It has even been ar-
gued that trust may not be possible in global virtual teams
[22]. In this experiment we study how channels of cooperative
communication can self-organize in an impersonal communi-
cation network, even if replying conflicts fundamentally with
the subjects’ immediate interests.
Information flow in asynchronous communication. In asyn-
chronous communication, obtaining specific, solicited infor-
mation from others requires them to respond to a request for
that information. A priori, an answer may appear as an act of
altruism if it has a cost: There is no immediate payoff for its
sender. Thus it may be viewed as paradoxical, that this kind
of communication can result in cooperation, especially under
strict time constraints.
Imagine a group of professional individuals, where indi-
viduals in the group are operating under the pressure to com-
plete a task under time constraints. However, each individual
depends on the help of an expert to complete this task. A
request for help with a task could be exemplified as follows:
Example of a request, A: “I am designing an interface for
customers to order products on the internet. I have finished
the artwork but am unable to carry out the programming. Can
you help me with that or do you know someone who can?”
Note that the request contains both information on A’s
expertise and on the desired, lacking, expertise. In case the
receiver of the request “B” does not have the expertise to
help “A” complete the task, but knows someone who can, a
possible response could be:
Example of a reply, B: “Yes, I do know someone and this
person is C. Here is C’s email address.”
B’s reply in the example contains information useful to A.
However “B” has to sacrifice valuable time to provide that
information. Instead, “B” could spend this time looking for
information valuable to “B” by sending requests to others. To
mimic this type of interaction, we propose an game termed
The expert game.
Experiment and model
Definition of the expert game. The expert game is a discrete
game for N > 2 participants. In a game with N partici-
pants, there are exactly N different types of expertise and
N different tasks. Each task matches one type of expertise,
which is needed to complete the task. Prior to the game, each
participant is assigned a unique expertise and a unique task
at random. The only condition is that each expertise and the
matching task are assigned to different participants. Assigned
expertise and task are revealed only to the participant they
are assigned to. Participants gain a point if they find the ex-
pert matching their task, send the expert a request for help
and receive a reply to their request. In each round each player
can send at most one message to another player. There are
four types of messages:
Request (Q) Can be sent to any other participant. The
sender’s expertise and task are revealed to the receiver.
Reply Participants can only send a reply to recipients who
have previously sent them a request. There are three types
of replies:
Confirmation (C) Can only be sent if the sender’s ex-
pertise matches the receiver’s task. The receiver’s task
is thereby successfully completed and he earns a point.
Referral (R) Can only be sent if the sender’s expertise
does not match the receiver’s task and if the sender
knows whose expertise matches this task. The identity
of the expert is revealed to the receiver.
Negation (N) Can only be sent if the sender does not
know whose expertise matches the receiver’s task.
Subjects can also refuse to send a message altogether. At the
end of each round, when all participants have decided upon
one of the above actions, all messages are simultaneously de-
livered. An example of a possible interaction of players is
shown in Fig. 1. Even when participants have earned a point
(i.e. received a confirmation), they continue playing until the
game is completed but they can not earn additional points
during this game. The game is terminated after a certain
number of rounds. The approximate number of rounds for
each game is known to the participants but is varied randomly
by small deviations to reduce edge effects.
The rules stated above allow participants to refuse sending
messages, but any kind of deception is prohibited. The par-
ticipants can therefore never choose between different replies,
but are always restricted to reply with either a Confirmation
(as the expert matching a corresponding request for exper-
tise), a Referral (when not the expert but with knowledge
on the expert’s identity) or a Negation (no knowledge of the
expert’s identity).
Experiment. We performed a preliminary experiment with 4
consecutive games and 8 participants from the Biocomplexity
group of the Niels Bohr Institute at the University of Copen-
hagen. Experiments with more participants in a more con-
trolled setting are under preparation. All participants were
gathered in the same room but were instructed only to com-
municate with each other by means of a instant messaging
interface which identified each participant by a virtual iden-
tity of a different name. Expertise and tasks were represented
by numbers, which were handed to the participants before
each game.
Model: Bayesian agents. We model human behaviour in an
iterated expert game using an agent-based model. In this
model, the agents (i.e. participants) make individual es-
timates on each of the other agents’ response probability.
Bayesian inference is applied to adjust the estimates of re-
sponse probabilities. Re-assessment of probabilities is done
between any two games, i.e. the data collected during a given
game is employed to derive a posterior probability distribu-
tion from the previous prior. We further assign three constant
personality traits, common to all agents. Using these traits
along with the estimated responsiveness, agents choose mes-
sage type and communication partner in each round.
Responsiveness estimate — The responsiveness θ rep-
resents the probability that a request is responded to in the
next round. Assuming that this probability does not change,
this constitutes a Bernoulli process. The likelihood that a hy-
pothesized θ leads to a reply in round k after the request there-
fore matches the waiting time distribution for the first success
in a Bernoulli process. The likelihood that a game ends before
a reply is received is the probability of not succeeding once in
k Bernoulli trials, where k represents the number of rounds
that were played after the request was sent:
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P (k|θ) =
{
(1− θ)k−1 · θ Reply received in round k since the request
(1− θ)k No answer, game ended k rounds after request [1]
In our model, each agent x maintains a set of hypotheses
of every other agent y’s responsiveness θxy. These hypotheses
are then used as a basis for choosing communication partners.
The set of hypotheses used is θxy = 0.05 ·n, with 0 ≤ θxy ≤ 1
and n a non-negative integer. Each hypothesis is assigned
an estimated probability P (θxy) of being correct. After each
game the estimated probability for each hypothesis θxy is up-
dated if x sent a request to y. The updated probability esti-
mates considering the latest reply time are determined using
Bayesian inference:
P (θxy|k) ∝ P (k|θxy) · P (θxy) with
∑
θxy
P (θxy) = 1 .
[2]
Here, P (θxy|k) represents the updated probability estimate of
the hypothesis that the responsiveness is θxy, given the latest
reply time k as evidence. P (k|θxy) represents the likelihood
of the observed reply time given the hypothesis θxy as defined
in equation 1, and P (θxy) represents the prior probability es-
timate of hypothesis θxy. The updated distribution becomes
the prior distribution in the next game.
Only the first request to a particular agent and the first
reply are taken into account. In the special, and generally
rare, case that a referral (R) is sent after a negative reply
(N) has been sent, this is considered to be an instant reply
(k = 1), regardless of the actual reply time. This is to say that
the second reply (R) is considered as a generous act valued
similarly as an immediate reply.
Agent x estimates agent y’s responsiveness by the mean
reply probability 〈θxy〉. This is given by the weighted average
of the probability estimates of all hypotheses:
〈θxy〉 =
∑
θxy
θxy · P (θxy) [3]
This responsiveness estimate is used by x as an estimated
value of y as a communication partner.
Choice of message type and communication part-
ner —
In addition to the constraints given by the rules of the
game, the modeled agents never send more than one mes-
sage of each type to a particular agent during the same game.
This is a point where the model may remove some of the ac-
tual human behavior: In reality, the experimental subjects do
occasionally repeat similar messages. Finally, agents will al-
ways instantly send a request to the expert for their task if
they learn who this expert is and have not sent this expert a
request previously.
We characterize the agents’ personalities in terms of their
preference for replying to requests versus that of sending re-
quests themselves. This is modeled using three constant per-
sonality traits: The preference to send a request (α); the pref-
erence to send referrals and confirmations (β); the preference
to send negations (γ), where we have for simplicity assumed
the probabilities of referrals and confirmations to be similar.
The choice of message to be sent in a round is made at random
from all possible messages meeting the criteria defined above.
The probability of choosing a particular message is propor-
tional to the senders’ preference to send this type of message
multiplied with their estimate of the receiver’s responsiveness
〈θxy〉 (see Appendix equation 4 for a more formalized expres-
sion). This is to say that a sender will make an estimate on
the expected future payoff of sending a message to a particu-
lar recipient. After learning who the expert for their task is,
an agent’s preference to send requests (α) to any other partic-
ipant than their expert is lowered to 0.1% of its original value
for the rest of the game.
Results
Experimental results — Generally, all players issued all
types of messages. Approximately 66 percent of messages
were requests (Q), 18 percent were referrals and confirmations
(R& C), and 15 percent were negations (N). This means, that
most time-resources were in-fact allocated to the acquisition
of information (Q), but a significant fraction was devoted to
replies. Considering that referrals and confirmations purvey
potentially N times as much information as negations, the
comparably large rate of negations is noteworthy.
Table 1 shows the time lag between requests and replies
for requests that did not go unanswered. The data show that
there is an expected delay of replies of more than one round.
This delay is somewhat longer for negative replies. It also
shows that the rate of sending positive replies is somewhat
higher than that of negative replies. More than half (55 %)
of requests remained unanswered by subjects at the end of
the game, even if the subjects did possess the knowledge re-
quested.
How does information pass from one subject to another?
To explore this, we map the network formed by messages be-
tween subjects. The adjacency matrices shown in the figure
depict a fairly noisy pattern for games 1 to 4 (Fig. 2b—e).
However, one notable aspect of these matrices is that the first
game has produced much more uniform sampling of all in-
teractions. In games 2 to 4 a more heterogeneous pattern is
observed, with many messages between certain subjects, while
other pairs of nodes do not interact at all. This can be inter-
preted as communication pathways forming at an early stage
of the experiment and stabilizing, or evolving at a lower rate,
later on.
When condensing all communication into a single adja-
cency matrix (Fig. 2a), a clear pattern of reciprocity emerges.
This is seen by the fact that the matrix is much more sym-
metric than would be expected from random interactions be-
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tween nodes. Reciprocity has in fact been recognized as a
consistent feature of human communication and cooperation
more generally [23]. To further explore the subjects’ percep-
tion of their interactions, after the experiment, all subjects
were asked to provide an ordered list of collaborators, ranging
from best to worst. From this list we composed the perceived
adjacency matrix shown in Fig. 2f. Note the qualitative simi-
larity to Fig. 2a. This shows that the participants were aware
of their preferred communication channels, a further confir-
mation that the reciprocal structure is far from random. To
assess if the networks of communication formed within the
separate games are related, we compute the correlation coeffi-
cient between all combinations of any two networks (Fig. 4a).
The data shows that indeed positive correlations exist and are
stronger the shorter the time between two games. The corre-
lations between distinct games are strongest for the last and
second to last game, indicating that communication channels
may become more stable over time, i.e. mutual agreements to
communicate and cooperate are re-enforced.
We also analyzed the participants’ behavior as a function
of round within each game (Fig. 5). During the first round,
the only allowed message is a request, therefore all partici-
pants send messages during the first round. The rate of re-
quests then decays approximately linearly with time. As infor-
mation about the participants’ expertise is passed along with
requests, information gained about others increases (Fig. 5d).
The rate of confirmations and referrals reaches comparatively
low, but non-zero values after the second round (Fig. 5b),
a similar behavior is observed for the negations (Fig. 5c).
Fig. 5e shows the time dependence of the fraction of relevant
knowledge that was received, i.e. knowledge of the desired
expert. Interestingly, almost all players learn the identity of
the expert needed to complete their task after 4 to 6 rounds
in all games but the first. This is remarkable, because the
value of the overall knowledge gained about others reaches
only approximately 0.5 during the same time (Fig. 5d). This
means, that indeed the communication network is capable of
channeling desired information more quickly to its recipient
than by random messages. The network could be said to have
acquired the ability of efficient information retrieval.
Modeling results — We simulated games with the
Bayesian agents described by our model. The modeled agents
were homogeneous regarding their personality traits and — to
yield agreement with the experimental data — had to be given
strong cooperative preference for referrals and confirmations
(α = 1 , β = 5 and γ = 1). The network formed by the simu-
lated players is shown in Fig. 3. As in the experimental data
(Fig. 2), a heterogeneous communication network forms over
the four games with generally reciprocal communication links
between agents. The comparison of the correlation matrix
(Fig. 4) again shows reasonable agreement with the experi-
mental data, however the temporal correlation between games
is not as pronounced as in the experiment.
Within the noise resulting from the small number of games
played, the agreement regarding the dependence on timestep
shown in Fig. 5 is remarkably good.
Conclusions
Our experiment shows that cooperation arises in a setting
where subjects communicate only through an electronic in-
terface and no face-to-face contact or emotional content of
messages are possible. We find that stable channels of com-
munication form between subjects that are robust against re-
peated perturbations of their network. These channels can be
viewed as robust treaties between the partners, with replies
issued signaling the willingness to cooperate, but also the ex-
pectation of receiving help, in the future.
This interpretation is supported by the pronounced reci-
procity in the network of the stable links. Along the links,
specific information is acquired by individuals more efficiently
than random information — the established network acts as
an efficient information retrieval system. Once stable links
are acquired, maintaining these becomes of high priority for
individuals: Subjects are willing to sacrifice substantial time-
resources in order to reply to requests with referrals, confir-
mations and even negations. Especially negations carry little
direct information content but do purvey an indication of the
willingness to cooperate in the future. In that sense, these
messages may be a way of re-enforcing existing collaborations.
In conclusion, frequently and efficiently communicating
with some communication partners necessarily leads to the
neglect of others. Our results suggest that human communi-
cation is by no means a generous process and that coopera-
tion does not emerge automatically, but requires investments
in the establishment of new partnerships and expenses for the
maintenance of established ties.
Materials and Methods
Experimental data. The social experiment was carried out at the Center for Models
of Life, Niels Bohr Institute Copenhagen, Denmark, in October 2013. Subjects were
researchers with a background in theoretical physics. Identities were anonymized.
The game was played with four repetitions during a period of approximately 2 hours.
Computer Simulations. All data analysis and computer simulations were carried
out on standard desktop computers.
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Fig. 1. Expert game example. Schematic showing a possible interaction between individuals. Matching colors denote matching expertise. a, Player A contacts
player B in search of the expert. B thereby gains information both on the search target and the expertise of A. b, B receives another request by player C. B is able to match
C’s search request with previously gained information on A. c, B issues a positive reply (R) to C and directs C to its desired expert A. C now has all relevant information and
can contact A for help.
reply type average lag average rate average lag (Mod) average rate (Mod)
N 2.50 0.24 2.64 0.25
Y 2.28 0.33 2.73 0.46
no reply with knowledge – 0.55 – 0.65
Appendix
Choice of message
If a modeled participant knows who his expert is, but has not sent him a request yet, he will always do so in the next round.
If a participant knows his expert his preference to send requests α is also reduced to 0.1% of its original value, until the next
game. Otherwise P (M = (T, x, y), k) is the probability of a message of type T ∈ {Q,R,C,N} being sent from participant x to
participant y in round k. Hk is the set of all messages M = (T, x, y) that have been sent from round 0 to k. E(y) represents
the participant whose expertise is needed to complete the task assigned to participant y.
P (M = (T, x, y), k) ∝

〈θxy〉 · α, if M /∈ Hk−1 ∧ T = Q ∧ x 6= y
〈θxy〉 · β, if M /∈ Hk−1 ∧ T = R ∧ {(Q, y, x), (Q,E(y), x)} ⊆ Hk−1
〈θxy〉 · β, if M /∈ Hk−1 ∧ T = C ∧ (Q, y, x) ∈ Hk−1 ∧ E(y) = x
〈θxy〉 · γ, if M /∈ Hk−1 ∧ T = N ∧ (Q, y, x) ∈ Hk−1 ∧ E(y) 6= x
∧ (Q,E(y), x) /∈ Hk−1
0, otherwise
[4]
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Fig. 2. Experimental communication networks. Adjacency matrices and corresponding networks for the entire duration (a) and games 1—4 separately
(b—e). Indices on axes denote players 1—8. f, Adjacency matrix resulting from the players’ self-assessment data.
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Fig. 3. Model communication networks. Adjacency matrices and corresponding networks for the entire duration (a) and games 1—4 separately (b—e).
Indices on axes denote players 1—8.
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Fig. 4. Correlation matrix. a, Experimental correlation between the adjacency matrices of different games. b, Corresponding modeled correlation matrix.
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Fig. 5. Behavior as function of time step. Number of messages per person for questions, positive (Y or R) and negative (N) answers for games 1 (red circles)
and 2–4 (green, blue, purple symbols) and average of all games (black lines). a, Experimental data. b, Modeled data.
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